We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage.
Original Source [2]
Links:
[1] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/feature-article/domestic-politics-and-formation-international-environmental-agreements
[2] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069616303060
[3] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/author/carmen-marchiori
[4] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/author/simon-dietz
[5] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/author/alessandro-tavoni-et-al
[6] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/journal/journal-environmental-economics-and-management
[7] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/thesaurus/global-environmental-agreements
[8] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/thesaurus/politics
[9] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/thesaurus/climate-change
[10] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/thesaurus/emission-targets
[11] http://admin.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/thesaurus/finance