The Brussels draft versus the Dunkel draft

Developing countries are concerned by the silent disappearance of some and the qver-simplificalion of other provisions of the Brussels Draft, 1990 -the first draft agreement reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. These provisions were of special interest 10 developing countries and were open for negotiations. But they da not find a place in the Dunkel draft text of 1991, which claims 10 be a "comprehensive representation of the final global package of the Uruguay Round". The new draft blocks several options for developing countries and scuttles the scope of further negotiations. An ourline of the major differences between the two drafts:
Brussels draft	Dunkel draft
1. ON WHAT CAN BE PATENTED
Article 30 leaves wider options for exemption from potentobility. It provides for exemption of plants and animals, including microorganisms and processes for their production. Furthermore, on grounds of public interest, national security,public health and nutrition, certain products like foods, chemicals and pharmaceutical products and their production processes may be exempted.	Article 30 withdraws the exemption status of microorganisms and microbiological processes. It allows exemption only ta plants and animals and biological processes. This provision is subject ta further review.
The time frame for review of this provision is negotiable.	The time frame for review is fixed at 4 years.
2. ON THE CONDITIONS AND OBUGA TIONS OF PATENT -HOLDERS
Article 32 speciFies the obligation of potent-owners to ensure that the working of potents satisfies public requirement.	Article 29 does not list the obligations of potent-holders.
It also specifies that working or exploitation of potents would mean monufacture of potented products or industrial applications of it in the country where the potent is held. The patent should be worked in the country of origin and not used abrood and imported back.	While obligotions hove been dropped, potent-holders" rights have been made shorper in Articles 27 & 28. The potent-holder hos been given exclusive importing rights. 8ut the clause on obligations to produce locolly has been diluted by allowing potents Hwithout discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology ond whether products are imported or locally produced".
If the potent is not worked by the potent-holder, it should be made available to others on payment of a royalty. This provision encourages transfer of technology and greater competition.	This compulsory licensing requirement has been dropped.
3. ON THE TERMS OF PROTECTION
Article 36 proposes the period of potent protection at 20 years. But it also provides the option that nationollegislation can determine the term of protection.	Article 33 retains the 2O-year protection period and deletes the option.
4. ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COUNTRIES TO CHANGE THEIR DOMESTIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON PATENTS
Article 68 keeps the time frame for transitional arrangements unspecified and open to further negotiations.	Article 65 specifies the time frame for all countries is one year, though developing countries have been granted an additional four years. Developing countries that don"t have a product potent system yet have been given a further concession of five years, adding up to a 10-year grace period. However, this time frame could get reduced os Article 27 calls for 0 review of potentable subjects after four years.
It says member stoles shall "provide, on accession", a time toble for application of the transitional arrangement. But it also speciFies that the time toble shall be without commitrnent.	This provision has been dropped and instead, member-states shall "ensure" that changes in a time table for their domestic laws are consistent with the provisions of the agreement.